During the 2007-2009 housing crisis, concentrations of foreclosed and vacant properties created severe blight in many cities and neighborhoods. The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) was established to help mitigate distress in hard-hit areas by funding the rehabilitation or demolition of troubled properties. This paper analyzes housing market changes in areas that received investments during the second round of NSP funding, focusing on seven large urban counties. Grantees used NSP to invest in census tracts with high rates of distressed and vacant properties, and tracts that had previously received other housing subsidies. The median NSP tract received quite sparse investment, relative to the overall housing stock and the initial levels of distress. Analysis of housing market outcomes indicates the recovery has been uneven across counties and neighborhoods. In a few counties, there is some evidence that NSP2 activity is correlated with improved housing outcomes.
To provide assistance to local communities severely affected by the crisis, Congress adopted a series of programs knowns as the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP). The three rounds of funding, known colloquially as NSP1, NSP2 and NSP3, provided a total of about $7 billion to state and local governments.
1 NSP was intended to mitigate the impact of foreclosures on neighborhoods by reducing the stock of distressed properties, removing visual blight and sites of crime, and signaling to residents that the neighborhood was capable of improvement (Joice 2011). Similar to the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, NSP was structured as grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to state and local governments and qualified non-profits. Grantees could use the funds for five specific activities: rehabilitation or redevelopment of foreclosed and vacant properties, demolition of blighted structures, land banking, and stand-alone financing for purchase or development of affordable housing. Neighborhoods (defined as census tracts) were eligible to receive investments based on the initial economic and housing market conditions, especially the prevalence of foreclosed and vacant properties. NSP was the largest public policy effort to address the impact of foreclosures on neighborhoods, and was a substantial influx of resources for many local communities. Oakley 2015, Immergluck 2012 , Newburger 2010 , Nickerson 2010 , Reid 2011 . In particular, they note the challenges of acquiring foreclosed and REO properties in targeted locations and the bureaucratic hurdles that slowed down the process of rehabbing and re-occupying distressed properties. They also point out that, for the most severely affected communities, the amount of NSP funding provided was modest relative to the number of distressed properties.
Only a few studies to date have documented neighborhood outcomes in NSP treated areas. Schuetz et al (2015) examine long-run housing market trends in NSP2 tracts and other low-value tracts across 19 counties. They find that NSP2 tracts were initially more distressed than average tracts, but followed similar housing market trajectories during the recovery period. Ergungor and Nelson (2012) examined vacancy rates of former REO properties purchased with NSP funds to vacancy rates of comparable former REOs, not funded by NSP, in Cuyahoga County. They find that, in neighborhoods targeted by the first round of NSP, properties purchased by individuals (i.e. presumed owner-occupants) are less likely to be vacant. They find no significant difference in vacancy rates among NSP2-targeted areas, although during their study period, very few NSP2 properties had completed rehabilitation. Graves and Shuey (2013) conduct a small scale, mostly qualitative analysis of changes in social conditions around properties in Boston that were rehabbed using NSP funding. The authors find that only half of the eight NSP properties in their studied had begun or completed renovation as of 2012, while seven of the eight control properties (also previously vacant REOs) had been rehabbed.
Somewhat surprisingly, the authors learned through interviews that most neighbors of REO properties were not aware of the previous foreclosures, and did not perceive the vacant homes as significant disamenities. However, the small sample size and Boston's strong housing market, relative to most NSP grantees, make it difficult to extrapolate from these results. Pooley 2014; Schwartz et al 2006; Smith and Hevener 2011) . These studies vary in geographic area and methodology as well as programs studied, making it difficult to draw consistent conclusions about the effectiveness of publicly-funded housing rehabilitation.
This study presents the first multi-city quantitative analysis of how NSP2 investments were targeted and how NSP2-treated neighborhoods have fared during the housing recovery. We use data collected from NSP2 grantees on the location, type, and timing of their investments to assess whether census tracts that received NSP2 investments experienced stronger housing market outcomes than comparable tracts in the same counties. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the NSP2 data collection and presents descriptive statistics on county-and tract-level investments. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and additional data sources. Section 4 presents empirical results;
Section 5 outlines next steps and conclusions.
Section 2) NSP2 background
The analysis focuses on the second round of funding, NSP2, which was designed to correct some limitations of the first round of funding and was the subject of a formal evaluation by HUD. NSP1 was allocated to state and local governments via an automatic funding formula, and resulted in widespread dispersion of small amounts of investment. By contrast, NSP2 was awarded based on competitive applications, with grantees encouraged to concentrate their investments in a few targeted neighborhoods at sufficient scale to improve housing market outcomes (Joice 2011). Applicants had to specify the type and expected quantity of activities (i.e. number of properties to be rehabbed or demolished) and list the census tracts in which they planned to invest. The range of allowed activities gave grantees flexibility to tailor their strategies to local housing market conditions, so that grantees could pursue different strategies in different cities (Reid 2011) . Like other components of the Federal stimulus program, NSP2
funds were required to be spent quickly, with 100 percent of funds expended by February 2013.
2.1) Data collection
The data used in this analysis were collected during an evaluation of NSP2 commissioned by HUD, which concluded in June 2014 (one year after the expenditure deadline). Propertylevel information on the location, type, timing, and expenditures on NSP2 investments were collected from 28 grantees across 19 counties. The counties were selected to provide a diversity of underlying housing markets, to include grantees with very large NSP2 awards (overall and predicted per-census tract), and oversampled states with high incidence of financially distressed
properties. For the current study, we focus on the seven largest counties, because they have enough tracts that received NSP2 investment to allow within-county analysis at the census tract level. The seven counties also vary by housing market conditions and implementation strategies, discussed below. spending. Stand-alone financing was used quite rarely by grantees in these seven counties;
almost all the financing in Los Angeles County was done by a single non-profit organization that made loans to another non-profit affordable housing developer. For a small share of properties, grantees used NSP2 funds for multiple activities on the same property, meaning that both rehab/redevelopment and demolition/land-banking were reported. 5 Interviews with grantees suggest that in some of these cases, grantees purchased properties with the intent to rehabilitate them but because of poor physical conditions, could not afford the rehab work so demolished the structure instead. 4 There is ongoing research to explore more systematically factors behind variation in costs and output across grantees and jurisdictions. 5 The NSP2 RFP lists five separate activities, but for purposes of this analysis, they are collapsed into three categories. Rehab and redevelopment both result in the presence of a newly renovated housing structure on the parcel, and so will look similar to external viewers (neighbors or potential investors). Similarly, demolition and land-banking result in a vacant structure or lot. Financing could be used as down-payment assistance to low-income homebuyers purchasing an existing structure (not one rehabbed through NSP2), or as development finance for new affordable housing (not carried out by the NSP2 grantee). Properties that reported having NSP2 funds for financing in conjunction with rehab/redevelopment are classified as rehab/redevelopment for purposes of this study.
For purposes of this analysis, census tracts are used as the definition of neighborhoods.
HUD's initial eligibility criteria were calculated for tracts, and grantees were required to identify specific tracts in which they intended to work. Table 3 shows the median number of treated tracts, tract-level scale of NSP2 investment for each county. Combining all seven counties, 648 census tracts received some NSP2 investment, with a median of three properties and under $400,000 per tract. The median number of housing units per NSP2 treated tract is about 1500, so NSP2 was a relatively small scale intervention in most tracts. As with the county-level summary, however, the tract-level size and scale of intervention varied across counties. The median NSP2 tract in Los Angeles had only two NSP2 properties, while Wayne County tracts had a median of 14 properties. Housing values vary widely across tracts within and across counties. To give a better sense of the scale of NSP2 expenditures per tract, the last column in Table 3 shows tract NSP2 spending divided by the tract median housing value (taken from the
2005-2009 ACS)
. These values also reflect differences in activities; for instance, Chicago's relatively high score of 9.7 reflects the acquisition of multifamily properties, which meant that Chicago's NSP2 grant supported larger projects in a smaller number of tracts. NSP2 investment metrics vary within counties as well; Appendix Table 1 shows the distribution of values for each metric by county.
Section 3) Empirical strategy and additional data sources
This paper presents evidence about where grantees targeted their NSP2 investments, what initial housing market conditions prevailed in NSP2 tracts, and how housing markets changed in NSP2 tracts during the program's implementation period, relative to other tracts in the sample counties. We present descriptive statistics on levels and changes for several key housing outcomes: the inventory of distressed properties, vacant properties, volume of arms'-length sales, and (with some limitations) prices of arms'-length sales. Probit models are estimated to explore how pre-NSP2 tract characteristics are correlated with the probability of tracts receiving NSP2
investments. To assess whether tracts that received NSP2 investment experienced the recovery period differently than other tracts in the same county, we estimate reduced-form OLS regressions on housing market changes as a function of NSP2 expenditures, controlling for initial tract characteristics. NSP2 tracts are compared to all non-NSP2 tracts in the same county and two plausibly more appropriate comparison groups: tracts that had previously received other housing subsidy programs and below-median income tracts. Below we discuss the empirical strategy in more approach, as well as challenges to identifying the impact of NSP2 investments.
3.1) Addressing potential tract selection bias
The primary challenge to assessing whether NSP2 caused changes in neighborhood housing markets is the potential for tract selection bias: NSP2 tracts may differ from non-NSP2 tracts in ways that would have altered their trajectories during the study period even in the absence of the program. The probability of selection bias seems quite high, however, the direction of the bias relative to possible control tracts is not obvious a priori. Grantees were required in their applications to target tracts considered at high risk for foreclosure and vacancy, based on a set of "risk scores" developed by HUD. 6 Therefore in the absence of NSP2, we might expect housing outcomes in NSP2 tracts to be worse over the course of the recovery than those in non-NSP2 tracts. However, the program's goal was to concentrate investments in tracts that were capable of improvement, not necessarily "worst case" tracts. Grantees were also encouraged to leverage NSP2 funds with other public or philanthropic funds, which may have steered NSP2 towards tracts with particular local assets. In these instances, NSP2 tracts may have had better prospects than some initially distressed tracts that were not targeted for NSP2.
Qualitative interviews conducted with grantees during the evaluation suggested that both types of selection occurred, sometimes in the same county. Some grantees indicated that they targeted tracts where they had prior relationships with non-profit affordable housing organizations, anchor institutions or local foundations. This is consistent with research by Fraser and Oakley (2015) and Reid (2011) , who found that grantees often used NSP in neighborhoods with long-standing plans for revitalization. In other cases, grantees faced political pressure to channel NSP2 funds to neighborhoods with long-standing challenges that probably could be not resolved with NSP2 (Abt Associates 2014) . Therefore it is difficult to predict the net effect of selection bias, which may also differ across counties.
There are two additional reasons to consider that NSP2 tracts might not have been systematically better or worse than non-NSP2 tracts. First, Reid (2011) points out that geographically specific information on foreclosures and REO properties was not available to HUD or grantees at the time that NSP was first adopted. Therefore HUD used proxy variables, such as the percentage of high-cost loans from HMDA, and county-wide data on housing prices and unemployment rates, to predict tract-level risk of foreclosure and vacancy. These data limitations make it unclear whether high scoring tracts that grantees targeted for NSP really had worse housing conditions at the time of application.
Second, implementation of NSP2 required grantees to acquire individual properties from among the distressed and vacant inventory available at that time, introducing some degree of random selection at the property level. The interviews suggest that grantees faced considerable difficulty acquiring foreclosed properties in their intended neighborhoods, because of limited availability, competition with investors, property physical conditions, and various regulatory and bureaucratic impediments (Abt Associates 2014) . 7 Some of these factors (particularly investor competition) may be correlated with tract housing market outcomes, but others (such as banks withholding foreclosures from sale and bureaucratic impediments within the NSP2 program) are potentially orthogonal to outcomes of interest.
A further suggestion of exogenous variation in tract selection is shown by discrepancies in which tracts were targeted in grantee applications and which ones ultimately received NSP2
investment. In Cook County, only 12 percent of the tracts targeted in the initial application received any NSP2 activity. In Los Angeles and Maricopa Counties, slightly more than half of initially targeted census tracts received NSP2 investment. By contrast, Wayne County only targeted 17 census tracts for investment, and ended up working in 75 additional tracts not initially targeted. Some of the discrepancies between targeted and treated tracts could be driven by grantees receiving smaller than requested NSP2 allocations, but interviews with grantees suggested that most of the geographic variation was driven by difficulty in acquiring suitable properties in their targeted neighborhoods within the program deadlines. 8 We use several approaches to create appropriate comparison groups. First, as described in Section 3.2 below, we estimate probit models to ascertain which observable tract characteristics prior to NSP2 are predictive of NSP2 investment locations. These characteristics are then controlled for in the regressions on housing market change. Second, because we cannot 7 Several grantees mentioned property physical conditions as limiting factors, either because poor quality would require too much work to rehab, or aversions to specific attributes, such as swimming pools. 8 Some prior studies have used the variation in treatment status among eligible or targeted subjects as the basis for quasi-experimental research design (for instance, evaluations of Moving-to-Opportunity by Ludwig et al (2008) and Katz et al (2001) ). In this framework, the eligible or targeted by untargeted subjects form the control group. However, in our seven sample counties, there are not enough NSP2 targeted but untreated tracts to serve as a control group. Nor can we use the HUD risk scores in a regression discontinuity analysis, because eligibility for NSP2 was not set by a strictly observed cutoff score.
directly observe the presence of tract assets, such as anchor institutions or non-profit housing providers, we rely on a proxy indicator to define a comparison group: whether the tract has previously received other housing programs. Specifically, we identify tracts that have housing activities funded through CDBG, HOME, LIHTC or the first round of NSP (NSP1). Tracts previously served by these programs may have similar unobservable characteristics to NSP2
tracts, but because NSP2 was much more limited in scale, many fewer tracts received NSP2 funding. 9 Third, because NSP2 tracts were selected based on distressed or disadvantaged conditions, we construct an alternate comparison group from all non-NSP2 tracts that initially fell below median income for the county. There is some overlap between tracts with other housing programs and low-income tracts; the amount of overlap varies across counties. In the descriptive analysis and regressions shown in Section 4, changes in housing market outcomes for NSP2 tracts are thus compared to all non-NSP2 tracts in the same counties, tracts with other housing programs, and low-income tracts. Because tract selection strategies varied across counties and across grantees within counties, we do not have strong priors on which comparison group provides the best correction for selection bias, and present results for all three potential comparison groups. 
3.2) Empirical strategy
The first part of the analysis explores pre-NSP2 housing market conditions in NSP2 tracts and various comparison groups, and seeks to determine what pre-treatment characteristics are predictive of NSP2 investment location. We present descriptive statistics and graphs on tract characteristics, particularly three housing market outcomes (distressed property inventory, 9 Prior funding through other housing programs is likely to have a direct influence on housing outcomes, so these programs are not appropriate to use as an instrument for NSP2 funding, but can be used to form a comparison group. 10 We tried similar analysis using propensity score matching to construct comparison groups. Because this method also relies on observable variables for matching, it offers no conceptual advantage to the current method, and regression results are generally consistent with those presented here. Results available upon request from authors.
vacancies, and sales volume). To more formally explore the determinants of NSP2 tract selection, we also estimate probit models on the binary outcome of NSP2 treatment as a function of baseline housing market outcomes (levels and lagged changes), other housing programs, and a variety of population and neighborhood characteristics. The general form of the probit model is shown below in Equation 1.
(1) More details on variable definition and data sources is provided in Section 3.4 below and in Table 4 . Summary statistics on all variables for NSP2 tracts, by county, are shown in Table 5 ;
Appendix Table 2 shows summary statistics for the variables, combining all tracts and counties.
The sample is limited to census places in which at least one census tract received NSP2 investment or was targeted for investment in a grantee's application. This restriction is imposed because many of the grantees are local government agencies that can only work within their political jurisdiction, and helps to control for unobserved factors that may vary across political boundaries within a single county (for instance, school quality or crime prevention provided by city governments). Six of the seven counties have NSP2 activity in multiple cities within the county; the exception is Philadelphia, in which the city and county are co-terminus.
The second part of the analysis examines changes in three housing market outcomes - characteristics. All models include fixed effects for census place, and have standard errors clustered by PUMA. As with the tract selection analysis, the sample is limited to census places with NSP2 investment activity or targeted for NSP2.
3.3) Measuring NSP2 treatment
We use two different metrics of NSP2 investment: a binary indicator for any NSP2 activity in a tract, and the total NSP2 expenditures divided by tract median housing value. As shown in Tables 3 and 4 , there is substantial variation across counties and tracts in the type of NSP2 activity, the number of properties, and amount of funds expended. Such details of NSP2 investment could plausibly affect the impact of NSP2 on tract housing outcomes. For instance, it is likely that a tract where NSP2 was primarily used to demolish blighted structures, resulting in a smaller housing stock but increased prevalence of empty lots, may have different housing outcomes than a tract where NSP2 was invested in rehabilitation or redevelopment. Five of the seven counties essentially specialized in a single activity -rehab for the Sand State counties, demolition/land-banking for Cuyahoga and Wayne -so estimating regressions separately by county simplifies the measurement of activity type. Unfortunately in the two counties that pursued mixed strategies (Cook and Philadelphia), the number of tracts using each activity is too small to estimate separate impacts.
It is also plausible that larger investments -by expenditure levels, number of properties, or property size -will have greater impact on surrounding housing markets. Expenditures are the preferred metric of investment size, because it should reflect a number of other features, including number of properties, property size, and potentially quality of rehab work (i.e. material cost) for which we have limited direct measurement (notably, unit counts or other property size measures). Because property values and therefore purchase prices may be higher in less distressed tracts, expenditures are divided by tract median housing values, to better reflect the relative size of NSP2 investments. Regressions were also estimated using dummy variables for "high concentration" NSP2 tracts, based on the number of treated properties. Results were generally consistent with those using normalized expenditures (available from authors upon request).
We estimate changes in housing outcomes over the full implementation period as a function of total spending during this time, rather than annual or other incremental changes and spending, for several reasons. The majority of NSP2 properties were completed within the last several months before the February 2013 expenditure deadline (indeed some had not been completed when the grantees provided final data), so there would be little observed annual activity in the early years of the program. We are also agnostic about when during the activity period spillovers would be apparent (particularly for longer rehab projects). And as a practical limitation, our data do not allow us to observe expenditure levels for intermediate time periods.
A final caveat on measuring NSP2 investment is that there may be more heterogeneity in "treatment" than we are able to capture using expenditures. More nuanced characteristics of treated properties -such as age and aesthetic appeal of structures, physical condition, quality of rehab work, and visual appearance during the investment period -are likely to be heterogeneous across treated tracts. Data on these characteristics are not available, so they cannot be included in regressions, but this is an area that could benefit from qualitative case studies of individual NSP2 projects.
3.4) Additional data sources
In addition to the NSP2 property-level data, the analysis uses secondary data from a number of sources. All variables are measured using constant 2000 tract boundaries. Variable definitions are shown in Table 4 ; summary statistics for NSP2 tracts by county are shown in Table 5 and for all tracts combined in Appendix Table 2 .
Information on financially distressed residential properties and housing transactions from 2006 through the first quarter of 2013 were purchased from Core Logic. An inventory of distressed properties is created by aggregating all properties in any stage of distress: any property after filing of a foreclosure start or sale and prior to exit from REO is flagged as in distress.
When shown in levels, distress is expressed as a ratio per 1000 total housing units; changes over time are based on counts of distress (because the denominator does not change). 13 Sales volume is measured as the number of arms'-length transactions per tract-year, for one-to four-family properties and condominiums. Transaction data is also used to calculate the share of sales purchased by non-owner-occupants (investors). More details on cleaning and variable construction using the Core Logic data is available in the technical appendix of the HUD report (Abt Associates 2014) .
To identify which tracts received non-NSP2 housing programs, property-level data was obtained from HUD on four housing subsidy programs: CDBG, HOME (excluding single- prices. It is also likely that individual properties that went on the market during this time period differ in value from average properties in the tract that did not transact. Therefore we present graphs of housing price levels and change for illustrative purposes, but do not use prices in the main regression analyses. Regressions on price changes are presented in Appendix Table 5 , and present generally similar results to the other dependent variables, but cannot be estimated for Cook County or using the two comparison groups. Caution should be used in interpreting all of the price results.
Section 4) Results
As intended by the legislation, NSP2 grantees targeted neighborhoods that had substantial inventories of distressed and/or vacant properties prior to the program. Most NSP2 tracts had below median income residents, large black and Hispanic population shares, and had previously received investments from other housing programs. During NSP2 implementation, the inventory of distressed properties in NSP2 tracts fell substantially in all sample counties. Changes in vacancies and sales volume in NSP2 tracts varied more across counties. There are few statistically significant differences in housing market changes between NSP2 tracts and other tracts in the same counties.
4.1) Descriptive statistics: Housing market conditions in NSP2 tracts
Although the impetus for NSP2 emerged from the foreclosure crisis, the program was designed to address both the current problem of financially distressed properties (those in foreclosure or REO) and long-standing vacant or abandoned properties. Grantees in four sample counties -Cook, Cuyahoga, Philadelphia and Wayne -used NSP2 in tracts where vacancy rates substantially exceeded distress rates ( neighborhoods was primarily one-to four-family properties; these properties tended to have higher rates of foreclosure than multifamily buildings. Table 5 tracts significantly lagged at least two comparison groups. In Cuyahoga, sales dropped by significantly less in NSP2 tracts than in other low-income tracts.
4.2) What neighborhood characteristics predict location of NSP2 investment?
As suggested by the descriptive statistics, there is some cross-county variation in how grantees targeted NSP2 investments, but some neighborhood characteristics consistently predict NSP2 tract selection across counties (Table 6 ).
In particular, counties vary in whether they targeted NSP2 towards tracts with financially Maricopa, but negatively predictive in Los Angeles. Because NSP2 funds were quite limited, in all counties, there were many low-income tracts that did not receive any NSP2 investments.
However, including median household income in the regressions as a continuous variable also does not yield significant results. On the other hand, black and/or Latino population shares are positive and at least weakly significant predictors of NSP2 tract selection in six of the seven counties. In Wayne County, the estimated coefficients on both black and Latino population shares are negative and significant, although NSP2 tracts in Wayne were on average 80 percent black, the highest share across all seven counties.
4.3) How did housing markets change in NSP2 tracts during recovery?
Regression analysis on housing market changes from 2009-2013 is conducted using three different outcome variables: financially distressed properties (Table 7) , vacancies (Table 8) , and arms' length sales (Table 9) . Each table presents results by county, for four specifications. In the first column, NSP2 presence is measured as a binary indicator. Regressions in columns 2-4 use the natural log of NSP2 expenditures divided by tract median housing value. The set of tracts also varies across specifications: regressions in columns 1-2 include all non-NSP2 tracts as the comparison group, column 3 includes only tracts with other housing programs, and column 4 includes only below-median income tracts.
Beginning with changes in distressed properties, there is essentially no evidence that NSP2 tracts experienced different trajectories than non-NSP2 tracts, or that the amount of NSP2
spending is correlated with changes in distress ( Table 7) . The coefficient on NSP2 activity is statistically significant only in two of the 28 regressions presented: Column 1 for Cuyahoga and
Column 3 for Maricopa. Both are positive, indicating that NSP2 activity is associated with smaller decreases in distress (on average, all tracts saw decreases in distress). But the lack of consistently significant results either for those counties across other specifications, or across counties for the same specification, makes it difficult to infer a robust association. In general, the signs and estimated magnitudes on NSP2 activity are fairly consistent within counties across specifications, even using different samples in columns 3 and 4.
The analysis of vacancies provides more evidence that NSP2 tracts in Cook and Cuyahoga counties saw different changes in vacancies during the recovery period (Table 8) . For
Cook County, the coefficient on NSP2 activity is positive in all specifications and significant in three. On average tracts in Cook saw drops in vacancies, so these results suggest that NSP2 presence or spending is associated with smaller decreases in vacancies, conditional on baseline characteristics. That is, NSP2 tracts did not improve as much as non-NSP2 tracts. In Cuyahoga, which on average saw increased vacancies during the 2009-2013 period, the negative and significant coefficients suggest that NSP2 activity was associated with smaller increases in vacancy -a potentially beneficial effect of NSP2. Among the other five counties, none of the estimated coefficients are significant at the five percent level, but once again signs and magnitudes are quite consistent within counties across specifications.
There is some evidence that NSP2 tracts in Cuyahoga and Los Angeles Counties saw stronger recovery in sales volume (Table 9 ). In Cuyahoga, the coefficients on NSP2 activity are positive and significant in all four specifications. From Figure 6 , Cuyahoga tracts on average saw continued drops in sales volume during 2009-2013, so these results suggest that NSP2 tracts fell by less. In Los Angeles, all four coefficients on NSP2 activity are positive, two are significant at the five percent level and one at the ten percent level. On average, tracts in Los
Angeles saw a small increase in sales volume during the recovery. While NSP2 tracts on average had decreased sales, the regression results suggest that, conditional on observable neighborhood characteristics, NSP2 activity was positively correlated with sales volume. There is somewhat less robust evidence in Table 9 that NSP2 activity in Miami was associated with smaller increases in sales volume; the coefficient on NSP2 spending is at least marginally significant in two specifications.
Considering the results from all three housing market outcomes, Cuyahoga shows the most robust evidence that NSP2 activity is correlated with a stronger housing recovery, namely 
Section 5)

Conclusion
The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program was intended to provide support to cities and neighborhoods that were particularly hard-hit by foreclosed and vacant properties. The program was designed to allow grantees flexibility, so that they could tailor their strategies to fit local housing conditions and build on institutional strengths and expertise. While the funds allocated for NSP were small relative to the overall housing stock and the scale of the foreclosure crisis, for many localities the amount of funding was comparable to or greater than funds received through CDBG or other affordable housing programs.
Grantees' approach to NSP2, characterized by the type of activity and targeted locations, were more likely to be selected for NSP2 investments.
The evidence of housing recovery during the NSP2 implementation period is quite mixed. NSP2 tracts in all counties saw substantial decreases in the inventory of distressed properties, as fewer properties entered foreclosure and the stock of REO properties was reduced.
Changes in vacancy rates and sales volume varied across counties. There is some evidence that NSP2 activity in Cuyahoga County is correlated with stronger recovery, measured by smaller increases in vacancy and smaller decreases in sales volume. Results also suggest that NSP2 activity in Cook County was positively correlated with vacancy changes, and NSP2 spending in Los Angeles was positively correlated with growth in sales volume. In other counties, there is not consistent evidence that NSP2 activity is associated with differential housing recovery.
A plausible reason for the lack of consistent results is the small scale of NSP2 activity in most targeted tracts. But some data limitations may also hinder our ability to precisely measure the program's impact. We do not have direct information on some tract-level assets or liabilities that could be correlated with NSP2 activity and with housing market changes, such as where local governments and non-profits used non-NSP2 funds for housing development or foreclosure mitigation efforts. Rather, we rely on observation of other housing programs to infer other activity, but this may be a noisy or biased measure. We also have limited data on changes in private capital's role in tract housing markets over time. It is also possible that the heterogeneous approach of grantees to implementing NSP2 within counties is not well captured by the relative expenditure metric we use.
Finally, it is possible that it is simply too early to detect the impacts of NSP2. The changes are measured through early 2013, roughly simultaneous with the expenditure deadline.
Many individual properties were not completed until nearly that time, so perhaps any spillovers to tracts had not yet been captured. On the other hand, the purpose of stimulus programs is to speed up the pace of recovery. If NSP did not generate tangible impacts until the end of its three-year implementation period, it may cast doubt on whether housing rehab and demolition are effective stimulus tools. 
